Abstract. In view of a secondary supply chain system composed of one manufacturer and one retailer, the paper builds the judgment model about how the prevailing manufacturer can carry out emission reduction through technology innovation under carbon emission constraints by taking Stackelberg Game theory, and compares the impacts of the manufacturer decisions on the prices and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. The results show that the prices and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer are the higher with technology innovation than without technology innovation under certain conditions, and are affected by the consumer preference for low carbon, market size and investment size parameter. In addition, there is a threshold value about the optimal carbon emissions caps and the policy can encourage technology innovation and carbon reduction within the threshold value. At last the results are verified by the sample application.
Introduction
Domestic and foreign scholars have preliminary study on the carbon constraints manufacturer's production decisions. Yalabik etc [1] explores the emissions regulations, consumer demand and the influence of enterprise competition to manufacturers emission reduction technology investment .Hua etc [2] conducted a comparative study of the carbon emissions of EOQ model and traditional EOQ model constraints,given the manufacturer's optimal order quantity under constraints of carbon emission, analyzed the influence of carbon trading, carbon pricing, carbon quotas on the manufacturers ordering quantity, carbon emissions and total cost.However,the literature does not consider the background of supply chain. In practice the manufacturer's emission reduction technology innovation will inevitably an important impact on the decision-making of the retailer.
Du etc [3] analyzed in two-stage supply chain that be composed by a single carbon-dependent manufacturers and a single carbon emissions permits suppliers,the impact of cap-and-trade mechanism to manufacturer decision and supply chain performance,also gived the optimal production quantity and the supplier manufacturer's optimal license price. Ghosh etc [4] in the global apparel supply chain background, analyzed and compared the cooperation of manufacturers and retailers under different channel power structures on the influence of emission reduction technology innovation, pricing and profit. However,the literature does not discuss the manufacturer's carbon emissions. Domestic scholars from the perspective of supply chain, more is to consider the carbon emissions policy on supply chain business decisions,but do not to consider the issue of emission reduction technology innovation.
The paper assuming the existence of mandatory emission reduction policy constraints, introducting emission reduction of technological innovation level parameters in the demand function, using stackelberg game theory to build the judgment model about the dominant manufacturer whether the implementation of emission reduction technology innovation profitable decision, aslo analysising the impact of mandatory emission reduction policies on enterprise innovation and carbon emissions.
Problem description and hypothesis
Suppose in the market, there is a simple supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer, manufacturer is the leader of the Stackelberg game, the retailer is the follower. If manufacturers only produce one product, the unit production cost is m c , providing products to 
Supply chain decisions of manufacturers have no innovation
When manufacturers have no innovation, i.e. 0 θ = ,the demand function can be expressed
.In decentralized decision-making, the game is Stackelberg game between dominant manufacturers and retailers,the method is reverse solution. Assumed that manufacturer's wholesale price is w , retailers according to their expected profit maximization principle to determine the optimal retail price is p ;and then the manufacturer according to the retailer's reaction to develop optimal wholesale price is w .
Retailer's profit function is:
Manufacturer's profit function is: 
Equation (5) 
Supply chain decisions of manufacturers have innovation
When manufacturers have innovation, the demand function can be expressed as.
( , )
,In decentralized decision-making, the game also is Stackelberg game between dominant manufacturers and Assumed that the technical innovation level isθ .
Manufacturer's profit function is: . Prove that. Proposition 1 shows that, when manufacturers implement emission reduction technology innovation, the wholesale prices and retail prices will be higher than the manufacturers do not implement emission reduction technology innovation. This phenomenon is observed in practice, i.e. environmental protection product prices generally will be higher than similar non environmental protection products. Proof: According to （12）、（13），there is:
Proposition 2 shows that the change of wholesale price and retail price closely related with the consumer preference parameter for low carbon μ , market size α and investment size parameter I ,i.e. consumers low carbon preference , market size growth of demand will push up the wholesale price and retail price, but with the scale of emission reduction technology investment larger, economies of scale will be produced, that will makes the wholesale price and retail price drop. 
B. Profitability comparison

,
Prove that. Proposition 3 shows that when consumers have low carbon product preferences, relative to the not implementation of low carbon technology innovation, manufacturers implementing low carbon technology innovation can make manufacturer and retailer's profits growth. However, apparently this result is by the consumer with the premise of low-carbon product preferences constraints. at the present stage because of China's relevant legislation and consumer awareness is relatively weak, resulting in low carbon practice effect is not ideal in our country enterprise.
Proposition 4:when Proof: According to （7）、（14），there is:
Prove that. Proposition 4 shows that the change of manufacturers and retailers' profits closely related with low carbon preference parameter of consumers μ , market size α and investment size parameter I .namely consumers low carbon preference and market size growth of demand will push up manufacturers and retailers' profits, but with the scale of emission reduction technology investment scale larger, economies of scale will be produced,that makes the manufacturers and retailers' profits drop. , The specific values should be based on the actual situation.
C. Mandatory carbon emissions constraints comparison
Conclusion
In the meet certain conditions, manufacturers to implement emission reduction technology innovation can make the price of manufacturers and retailers and profits higher than not innovation, but can be affected by low carbon preference parameters of consumer μ , market scale α and investment size parameter I , the policy to the manufacturer's optimal value range for carbon emissions cap is a threshold value, only in this interval values the policy can make the effection of encouraging technological innovation and emission reduction. This paper considering the mandatory cuts policy constraints, only consider the carbon emissions control constraints, actually carbon tax constraints in practice also is very common. in addition, analysis model can also be extended to the products or manufacturer's competition situation, these can be as the further research direction.
